The Strait of Hormuz and Eurasian Routes: How the Geopolitics of Trade Is Changing
by Marco Mizzau
The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz is bringing a question that goes beyond oil back to the centre of geopolitical competition: whoever controls the continuity of trade routes controls a growing share of global economic risk. As instability at maritime chokepoints increases uncertainty over transport, insurance and supplies, Europe and Central Asia face the need to strengthen their overland and Trans-Caspian connections.
The shift is not about replacing shipping with rail. It is about reducing dependence on a handful of chokepoints through alternative infrastructure, interoperable customs procedures and long-term investment. In this transformation, Kazakhstan, the Trans-Caspian corridor and Europe's ability to coordinate capital and technology are gaining strategic value.
Geography is once again determining not only the cost of trade, but the price of its vulnerability.
The crisis of chokepoints
Hormuz is one of the world's main points of concentration for energy trade. Its vulnerability directly affects Gulf exporters and major Asian importers, but the economic consequences spread far beyond the countries that physically use the Strait.
Rising energy costs reshape industrial margins. Maritime risk feeds into insurance premiums and trade finance. Uncertain delivery times lead businesses to increase inventories, tying up working capital. More heavily indebted economies and companies with less financial capacity absorb a disproportionate share of the volatility.
The result is a transformation in the economic function of logistics. What matters is no longer simply the cheapest route under normal conditions, but the availability of alternatives when normal conditions break down.
This does not mean that overland routes can replace global maritime transport. Differences in capacity, cost and the types of goods carried remain decisive. The Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian corridor, is not a direct alternative to Gulf oil routes through the Strait of Hormuz.
The relationship runs deeper: the vulnerability of one corridor increases the strategic value of the alternatives available across the trading system. In a fragmented economy, redundancy ceases to be merely inefficient duplication. It becomes a form of geopolitical insurance.
Eurasia as a system of connections
The Trans-Caspian corridor, which connects Kazakhstan to European markets through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Türkiye, is gaining importance in this new context. Its relevance does not depend on replacing the major ocean routes, but on diversifying connections between Central Asia and Europe and supporting new regional industrial flows.
Kazakhstan occupies a distinctive position. It has energy and mineral resources, maintains deep economic ties with Russia and China, and can further develop its connections towards the Caspian and European markets. Its opportunity lies not in choosing one geopolitical system over another, but in increasing the number of economically credible connections.
For China, continental connectivity contributes to route diversification and the security of its industrial supply chains. For Russia, Eurasian connections remain part of its economic and strategic depth. For Iran, integration with the Eurasian Economic Union and the development of overland routes also respond to the need to diversify markets and infrastructure amid sanctions and financial constraints. For Europe, Central Asia offers access to raw materials, markets and complementary productive capacity. These interests are not identical, but they can intersect.
The competition is not only about controlling territory. It is about building systems in which infrastructure, rules, financing and trade flows reinforce one another. A country with more routes does not necessarily control trade. But it depends less on those who can disrupt it.
Customs, data and artificial intelligence: the invisible power of corridors
The competitiveness of the Trans-Caspian corridor depends on more than railways, ports and terminals. It also depends on interoperable customs systems, data sharing and predictable transit procedures between Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus and European markets.
Artificial intelligence can help reduce congestion, documentation anomalies and transit times, but the economic advantage comes above all from coordinating physical infrastructure, rules and administrative capacity. In this sense, customs digitalisation becomes a component of supply-chain security.
A fundamental distinction emerges here between building a corridor and controlling how it operates. Financing physical infrastructure does not necessarily mean controlling the data, standards and procedures that determine the speed of flows. In Eurasian trade, power will also be distributed among those who own the terminals, those who manage the information and those who set the operating conditions for transit.
Capital follows predictability
Infrastructure becomes investable when it generates flows stable enough to support revenue, debt and long-term investment. Amid geopolitical uncertainty, this stability increasingly depends on the quality of the entire corridor, not merely the efficiency of an individual port or railway segment.
A modern terminal connected to slow customs procedures remains an incomplete investment. An efficient railway without adequate port capacity simply shifts congestion elsewhere. A digital platform without shared standards does not eliminate fragmentation.
This is why building Eurasian corridors requires patient capital, institutional coordination and industrial capabilities.
For investors, the opportunities span railway and port infrastructure, specialised logistics, energy, automation, digital systems and industrial services. In the short term, value may concentrate in the removal of operational bottlenecks. In the medium term, in growing volumes and associated productive activities. In the long term, in the formation of industrial platforms capable of connecting raw materials, processing and end markets.
The beneficiaries will be operators capable of reducing overall supply-chain risk. The most exposed will be production systems that continue to depend on a handful of chokepoints without the financial and logistical capacity to absorb shocks.
The new competition does not necessarily reward the shortest route. It rewards the one that makes the cost of continuity more predictable.
Europe and Italy's position
For Europe, the issue is first and foremost industrial. Diversifying routes does not mean abandoning maritime trade or pursuing impossible self-sufficiency. It means integrating infrastructure, trade policy, critical raw materials and financial capacity into a resilience strategy.
Kazakhstan and the Trans-Caspian corridor offer a tangible opportunity, but not an automatic one. Connections must become competitive, reliable and capable of supporting two-way trade. Raw materials can underpin flows towards Europe; technology, machinery, capital and industrial expertise can contribute to Central Asia's productive transformation.
Italy has capabilities aligned with this evolution: logistics, ports, engineering, machinery, energy, automation and customs systems. Its Mediterranean position is a potential advantage, not a guarantee of centrality. Italy's real opportunity is not to claim the role of an unavoidable terminus for the new routes. It is to help build the physical and intangible infrastructure that determines their value.
Europe's constraint remains its capacity to execute. Fragmented decision-making, financing and procedures may prevent a shared geopolitical interest from becoming a functioning economic platform. In this sense, the crisis affecting maritime routes is not just a security problem. It demands an industrial-policy choice.
The new geography of power
Hormuz and the Trans-Caspian corridor are neither equivalent infrastructures nor direct alternatives. The former highlights the vulnerability of a crucial passage for global energy flows; the latter offers a way to diversify commercial and industrial connections between Central Asia and Europe.
The Hormuz crisis demonstrates how concentrated traffic can transmit risk to the global economy. For Kazakhstan, developing alternative connections can turn its geographical position into greater strategic autonomy. For Europe, the challenge is to turn route diversification into an industrial policy supported by infrastructure, technology and long-term capital.
The new geography of power will be defined not only by those who control resources, but by those who can ensure access to them when traditional routes become vulnerable. A corridor's power is measured not only by what it carries. It is measured by the dependencies it can reduce.
by Marco Mizzau